



Many intuitively valid arguments involving intensionality cannot be captured by first-
order logic, even when extended by modal and epistemic operators. Indeed, previous
attempts at providing an adequate treatment of the phenomenon of intensionality in logic
and language, such as those of Frege, Church, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Montague and oth-
ers are fraught with numerous philosophical and technical difficulties and shortcomings.
We present Bealer’s solution to this problem which hinges on an ontological commitment
to theory of Properties, Propositions and Relations (PRP). At the most basic level we can
distinguish two conceptions in the theory of PRPs. An objective one tied to modality and
necessary equivalence, and a mental (intentional) one tied to concepts and the requirement
of non-circularity in definitions. Building on the work of Russell, Church and Quine, Bealer
proposes two distinct intensional logics T1 and T2 (presented in Hilbert form) correspond-
ing to these two conceptions, both based on the language of first-order logic extended with
an intensional abstraction operator. In T1 necessitation can be directly defined and the
axioms entail that we obtain standard S5 modal logic. These logics have a series of strik-
ing features and desirable aspects which set them apart from higher-order approaches.
Bealer constructs a non-Tarskian algebraic semantic framework, distinct from possible
worlds semantics and its problematic ontological commitments, yielding two classes of
models for which T1 and T2 are both sound and complete. Other features include being
able to deal with quantifying-in, and the various substitution puzzles, being free from ar-
tificial type restrictions, having a Russellian semantics, satisfying Davidson’s learnability
requirement, etc. Bealer proposes his logic as the basis of a larger philosophical project in
the tradition of logicism (or logical realism) concerning which we refer to his book Quality
and Concept (1982). This includes a neo-Fregean logicist foundation of arithmetic and
set-theory in which various (according to him) purely logical predication axioms ( and
intensional analogues of ZF, NGB, or Kelley-Morse axioms) are adjoined to T2, thereby
explaining incompleteness as a property of pure logic rather than of mathematics. Sur-
prisingly, and rather ironically, Bealer’s logic also fulfills Carnap’s thesis of extensionality
due precisely to its ontological commitment to the reality of PRPs. The proof of these
results consists either in lemmas which are merely stated or which are given but brief
sketches of a proof. We aim to give detailed proofs of all the mathematical logical results
that appear in Bealer’s Quality and Concept and in [2] and to clarify and simplify some of
the concepts and techniques so as to bring Bealer’s work to a larger audience of philoso-
phers, logicians, linguists and mathematicians and to be better equipped to address some
of the unsolved problems and challenges. We also include a brief introduction to other
approaches to intensionality in natural language and discuss how Bealer’s approach com-
pares favourably to some of them and is likely to benefit from the insights offered by others.
Keywords: Intensional Logic; Modal Logic; Non-classical Logics; Semantics of Natural
Language; Logicism; First-order Logic.
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1 Approaches to Intensionality
Ever since the pioneering work of Montague[29] there has been interest in applying math-
ematical logic to the formalisation of natural language. This involves setting up a system of
axioms and rules in a certain formal language together with a semantics which we would ex-
pect to be sound. The most basic requirement is that informally valid inferences in natural
language should be mirrored and captured faithfully in our formal system. We are at once
confronted with a major problem: that of the denotation and meaning of a sentence or parts
of a sentence in natural language. If we are to formally ascribe denotation and meaning (as
defined by Frege[14] and formalised by Church[10, 11, 12] ) to sentences in our formal language,
then these must be faithful to the actual denotations and meanings in natural language: for
instance, if two expressions have different meanings then their their corresponding formal ex-
pressions must likewise have different meanings. Is standard extensionalist Tarskian semantics,
or a modification theoreof, which discards meaning in favour of denotation, adequate for this
task ? Or must be look for an entirely new kind of formal semantics ? Also, to what extent
does this conflict of different semantics have implications for or is influenced by ontological and
epistemic positions ? We will focus on the adequacy of logical systems to represent and mirror
faithfully informally valid reasoning in natural language together with factors of economy, sim-
plicity and elegance, both of the logical system and its semantics. We refer the reader to the
table of desiderata for such logical systems in [1][p.35-15] for a list of 25 features which include
classical paradoxes which need to be accounted for, aspects of informal reasoning which must
be captured, various ontological and epistemic contraints as well as philosophically desirable
but not necessarily essential features, such as furnishing a foundation for mathematics.
Natural language abounds with syntactic constructions which prima facie have no analogue
in the restricted domain of mathematical discourse. Our major example will be propositional
attitudes (for example, an agent knowing or believing something), modalities and that-clauses.
These constructions are all examples of intensionality : the seem to involve the meaning of the
embedded sentence rather than its denotation. This is the cause of many serious problems. If
two terms are merely co-extensive then we cannot substitute one for another according to the
standard Leibniz rule. Suppose John believes that Scott is not the author of Waverley. Now
”the author of Waverley” and Scott designate the same individual. But if we substitute one for
the other in the sentence above we obtain ∴ John believes that Scott is not Scott. Following
[27] we call this type of problem (A), a particular case of a wide class of substitutivity problems
such as Mate’s puzzle and the paradox of analysis(see [1][ch.1 and 3] for a good introduction to
these problems). Another problem involves terms which have no denotation when we attempt
to apply the standard ∃-introduction rule. From John desires a unicorn we get ∴ ∃ x. John
desires x. How are we to interpret this existential quantifier ? What precisely does it quantify
? We refer to this type of problem as (B).
Historically [19, 20] modalities were some of the first of these intentional constructs to be
studied formally, but only in the context of a fragment consisting of adjoining modal operators
to already known systems of formal logic such as propositional or classical first-order logic.
Epistemic and temporal constructs are dealt with in an ad hoc fashion by introducing the
corresponding operators. With this approach it is clear that if we wish to have a general logic
capable of dealing with all these constructs then such a logic would have to be rather eclectic and
uneconomical in form, abounding in undefinable primitive symbols. On the other hand a new
kind of semantics was proposed, the possible worlds semantics associated with Carnap, Kripke
and Hintikka. This is the semantics that served as the basis for Montague’s approach, which
was later axiomatised by Gallin[15]. The key features are that meaning is a function from states
to extensions involving individuals and that we have an elaborate type-hierarchy and thus a
limitation on self-applicability of predicates. For instance, the expression number of the planets
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denoted different numbers at different historical epochs. The many-worlds approach has served
as the basis for the majority of general formal approaches to intensionality in language until
today. For example, the work of Cresswell[13], Bressan[8] and Tichý[30, 31].
Another approach is the sententialist (or inscriptionalist) one which is associated to Quine,
Davidson and Sheffler. The sentences which occur within intentional constructs are taken as
concrete inscriptions. In a recent formulation of Sheffler’s approach by David Parsons[27] we
have a considerably complex system which is first-order and employs standard Tarskian seman-
tics. In this system belief is taken as a binary relation between an agent and an inscription.
Sentences are the truth-bearers.
The third class of approaches are those which are neither based on many-worlds semantics
nor sententialism. Within this class are the very interesting approaches of Moschovakis[23,
24, 25] based on the ”sense as algorithm” idea, the Meinongian approaches of Zalta[32] and
Priest[32][p.129-145] and finally the approach of George Bealer, based on the theory of Proper-
ties, Relations and Propositions (PRP). Bealer’s logic is a classical first-order logic with equality
augmented with a term-forming abstraction bracket operator [A]x1...xn in the style of Quine’s
corner-bracket. This operator is syntactically very similar to the extensional operator {x : A}
in the Kelley-Morse formulation of set theory. Bealer starts out with two axiomatic systems
T1 and T2. The axiomatic systems are quite simple and natural. In T1 the box operator can
be defined and with this definition we obtain an embedding of S5 logic. The semantics are di-
rectly inspired by the ontology of PRPs, propositions and n-ary relations appear as irreducible
entities alongside individuals. Formulas within the bracket operator are interpreted by means
of such entities. In the class of models adequate for T1 each entity is assigned a set of possible
extensions ranging over the entire model. In T2 only one extension is considered.
We now consider in brief some arguments justifying the preferability of Bealer’s approach
relative to the many-worlds and sententialist/inscriptionalist approaches. We will then mention
some of the challenges and open problems which remain and how the approaches of Zalta and
Moschavakis might shed some light on these questions.
Let us consider what seems to be the most interesting sententialist approach, Scheffler’s
approach which has been lately formalised by D. Parsons in [27][185-208] as the first-order sys-
tem ISMLD
∗
. In order to deal with that-clauses [27][p.204] an infinite number of unanalysable
one-place predicates ”That-P” need to be introduced, corresponding to the infinite number
of sentence-inscriptions of the object language L. This violates Davidson’s learnability re-
quirement (cf. [1][p.28]). Although system ISMLD
∗
can deal with problems (A) and (B), it is
considerably complex, having numerous axioms and addiitonal recursive axiom schemes (rules)
introduced ad hoc to deal with the combinatorics of sentence-inscriptions and that-clauses. This
might be remedied by considering the axioms for Peano arithmetic and using Gödel coding.
Also, the question of completeness is not addressed. Leaving aside the violation of David-
son’s learnability requirement, all things being equal, a simpler and more elegant system which
solves the same problems is clearly preferable to the Sheffler-Parsons approach, A fatal problem
with the sententialist approach lies in the nature of sentence-inscriptions. The Sheffler-Parsons
approach is in itself a purely formal one. Despite the name, a ”sentence-inscription” may cor-
respond to entities of an indeterminate nature. The burden of the sententialist is to give a
precise account of such sentence-inscriptions and to justify the counter-intuitive stance that
propositional attitudes relate to sentence-inscriptions conceived as physical objects or sense
perceptions (or classes of such). As Bealer observes in [6][p.174], how can the prelinguistic
cognitive states of a child be described as a relating to sentence-inscriptions ? The PRP theory
on the other hand complies with our intuition: in knowing something we relate to propositions
or states of affairs, not sentence-inscriptions. There are many powerful arguments against a
sententialist and nominalist acount of propositional attitudes. See [28] for a refutation of nom-
inalist accounts of mathematical knowledge and [6][174-185] for a very detailed refutation of
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Scheffler’s brand of sententialism. Also, Bealer has shown in [7][p.216-223] how Quine’s and
Davidson’s scepticism regarding the need for entities such as PRPs can be fully met.
We now consider the many-worlds approach in which intensional constructs are interpreted
as functions from worlds to extensions. It is a desideratum that an intensional logic should
give a non-circular account for what is it for a proposition to be necessary, rather than leave
the box as an undefined symbol. The Kripkean explanation in terms of truth in all possible
worlds only sweeps the problem under the rug as it leaves open the question of nature of the
accessibility relation R between worlds. Bealer’s logic T1 makes the box a defined notion
in terms of more primitive concepts and Bealer makes a convincing case for a non-circular
definition of necessity in [1][p.204] based on the theory of PRPs. A serious problem in the
many-worlds approach is fine-grain distinction between rigid concepts, predicates with have
the same extension in all possible worlds yet clearly differ in sense. This is not a problem
in Bealer’s PRP approach as sense is taken an ontological primitive. Another similar problem
concerns the intensional interpretation of fictional names, predicates which arguably have empty
extension in all possible worlds. What exactly are these objects which allow us in particular
to make an application of rule (B) ? To believe in unicorns is not the same as believing in
fairies but both concepts correspond to the same function yielding the empty set in all worlds,
a function which is difficult to attach any interpretation to. It is clear that the PRP approach is
much more promising for it takes properties as primitives and unicorns and fairies correspond to
different concepts. There are many more problems and objections to the many-worlds approach,
such as regards to its higher-order presentation which imposes an artificial type-restriction on
certain ”transcendental” predicates . Higher-order systems also have the disadvante ofl being
incomplete.
The main problem which confronts Bealer’s system (in particular in the form T2) is dealing
with the wide class of substitutivity problems. While several of them are completely solved,
others demand a further fine-grained distinction between PRPs. Bealer made further progress
on these problems since [1] and in [7] he deploys the distinction between platonic and non-
platonic modes of presentation in order to deal with the nature of proper names and the
associated substitutivity puzzles. Although in [1] a pragmatic approach was proposed to solve
Mate’s puzzle, in [3] he develops the idea of ”logical form” to allows a much finer distinction
between intensional entities than is possible in T2. Although these theories are not entirely
worked out and complete they are clearly among the most promising approaches. We believe
that a comparison or combination with the ”sense as algorithm” approach of Moschovakis
or the emphasis on sentences as constructions in Tichý may lead to the adequate concept of
fine-grained distinction between intensional entities needed to solve the substitutivity puzzles.
2 The Nature of Bealer’s Logic
This paper aims to reformulate, clarify and simplify Bealer’s intensional logics, in particular
by furnishing detailed proofs, so as to bring his work to a larger audience of logicians, linguists
and philosophers. In this section we give our own motivation for Bealer’s logic and in section 3
we give a brief outline of the Bealer’s own logico-linguistic motivation for his logic, the details
of which can be found in [1][Intr. and Ch.1]. Most of the lemmas in [1, 2] are either merely
stated or given a sketchy outline of a proof. The rest of the sections are dedicated to proving in
detail the soundness and completeness of Bealer’s systems T1 and T2 as well as reformulating
and simplifying certain concepts and details. We then conclude with a discussion of the work
the remains to be done.
In certain versions of set theory (such as Kelley-Morse Set theory as presented in the classic
book General Topology) one starts from standard first-order logic with equality endowed with
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an extension operator, a term-forming operator which in general takes a formula φ and forms the
class {x : φ(x)} where φ can have other free variables besides x. Here the variable x functions
like a quantified variable and the concepts of bound and free variable are extended in th expected
way, including the usual proviso for performing substitition of terms for variables. The other
fundamental feature is the presence of the distinguished binary membership predicate ε. The
two fundamental axioms are the classification axiom scheme and the axiom of extensionality
which express how ε determines equality.
The basic idea of George Bealer’s first-order intensional logic is to consider an intensional
version of a similar term-forming operator [x : φ] (where we use square braces instead of curly
ones). We call these ”classes” intensional abstracts. Semantically, we can think of this logic
as being a set theory with a plurality of membership predicates εw (with some analogy to
”possible worlds” semantics) and in which equality is intensional equality, a stronger property
than mere membership equivalence (in this case, membership equivalence for all membership
predicates). Such a membership equality for all membership predicates is called necessary
extensional equality and is weaker than strict intensional equality. We also consider a special
distinguished membership predicate representing the ”actual world”.
Consider a version of Bealer’s logic without the intensional analogue of the membership
predicate and consider two primitive notions of equality, ordinary equality = corresponding
to strict intensional equality and ≈ expressing necessary extensional equality. In this ver-
sion we do not have the analogue of the Kuratowski construction of ordered-pairs and so
we must take as primitives abstracts over (possible empty) sequences of distinct variables
[x1...xn : φ]. We can remedy this by introducing an ordered-pair operation as a primitive
with the expected axiom (x, y) = (x′, y′) iff x = x′ & y = y′. From this we can form arbitary
n-tuples (x1, ..., xn) in the expected way. Thus we can define [(x1, ..., xn) : φ(x1, ..., xn)] as
{x : ∃x1, ...xn.x = (x1, ...xn) & φ(x1, ..., xn)}. We also consider the 0-tuple which we denote
by ∅, an additional primitive constant. Then we have that [∅ : φ] is [x : x = ∅ & φ]. In
Bealer’s logic this is interpreted as the proposition that φ. In extensional set theory, when φ is
closed, these classes can either be the ordinary empy set ∅ or equal to the set {∅} depending
on whether φ holds or not. Thus, in this case these kinds of abstract correspond to truth
values. In general they correspond to taking the proposition φ as a term. Consider the classi-
cal set-theoretic operations (functions) that can be performed on classes such as intersection,
complement, projection (of a binary relation). These are the term analogues of the logical
operations conjunction, negation and existential quantification. We can furthermore consider
an expansion which involves transforming an n-ary relation R into a n + 1-ary one R′ in a
trivial way (x1, ..., xn, xn+1) ∈ R′ iff (x1, ..., xn) ∈ R. There is also the inversion or, in general, a
permutation of an a n-ary relation as well as the identification of pairs of variables (generalised
diagonals). In our situation these must be considered in principle as merely meta-syntactic
operations. The central idea of first-order logic intensional logic, which allows us to define
an adequate semantics, is the decomposing the structure of intensional abstracts in terms of
such meta-syntactic operations, the most notable aspect being the use of a generalised form of
substitution in which intensionally bound variables of the term to be inserted are added to the
bound variables of the term they are substituted into.
3 Brief Motivation
3.1 Quantifying-in
Consider the following intuitively valid inference:
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Whatever x believes is necessary.
Whatever is necessary is true.
Whatever x believes is true.
In standard quantifier logic this would be formalized as follows:
∀y.B(x, y)→ N(y)
∀y.N(y)→ T (y)
∀y.B(x, y)→ T (y)
Now consider:
Whatever x believes is true.
x believes that A.
It is true that A.
If we treat that-clauses as singular terms, and represent for a formula A the term ’the
proposition that A’ by [A] then we can formalize this inference as follows:




Whatever x believes is true.
x believes that v believes something.
It is true that v believes something.
By analogy we would formalize this as follows:
∀y.B(x, y)→ T (y)
B(x, [∃v.B(x, v)])
T ([∃v.B(x, v)])
But now consider the inference:
x believes that he believes something.
There is someone v such that x believes that v believes something.
A candidate for formalization would be:
B(x, [∃y.B(x, y)])
∃v.B(x, [∃y.B(v, y)])




We need to find a way of dealing with substitutivity failures for materially equivalent and
co-referential formulas. For instance:
x believes that everything runs.
Everything runs if and only if everything walks.




x wonders whether y is the author of Waverley
y is the author of Waverley
x wonders whether y = y
W (x, [y = ιz.A(z)])
y = ιz.A(z)
W (x, [y = y])
Intensional entities can thus be different even if their extension be the same. What kind of
entities do the [A] correspond to ? Some approaches:
• Linguistic entities (Carnap, Quine): structural descriptions of a formula or inscription of
a formula. But there is a difficulty with the Langford-Church translation test.
• Nothing at all: the above metalinguistics names and descriptions can be analysed away
completely (Scheffler). According to Bealer these approaches seem to violate Davidson’s
learnability requirement.
• Extra-linguistic entities such as propositions (Bealer’s neologicism).
According to Bealer there are two kinds of intensional entities. According to the first (traced
back to Leibniz and one of Church’s formulations of Frege’s theory of sense) two intensional
entities are equal if and if they are necessarily equivalent. This is related to possible-worlds
semantics and deals with necessity and possibility. A definition need only be a necessary
equivalence
According to the second conception each intensional entity when defined completely must
possess a unique non-circular definition. According to Bealer this is found in Leibniz’s distinc-
tion between simple and complex properties and Russell’s doctrine of logical atomism. This
conception is used to treat intentionality: belief, desire, perception, etc.
Example of a deduction valid in the first conception but not in the second:
x wonders whether there are trilaterals which are not triangles.
Necessarily all and only triangles are trilaterals.
x wonders whether there are triangles which are not triangles.
Other nominative formations in language such as the gerundive and infinitive are formal-
ized by intensional abstraction over variables [A]x1,...xn . Intensional abstracts in general thus
correspond to propositions, relations and properties.
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3.3 Bealer’s Intensional Logic
What is Bealer’s intensional logic ? The language of Bealer’s intensional logic is that of
first-order logic with equality with a finite number of predicates symbols extended with term-
forming intensional abstraction operators [ ]x1..xn . There are two kinds of intensional entities
and thus two distinct axiomatic systems of intensional logic, T1 and T2. Bealer’s formulates
two new classes of model for which T1 and T2 are both sound and complete. T1 contains
standard S5 modal logic. Using a single primitive binary predication predicate ∆ and additional
so-called ”predication” axiom-schemes we obtain a neo-Fregean formulation of arithmetic. In
[1][ch.7] Bealer argues that if we accept the ontology of intensional entities then we can translate
intensional logic into standard extensional logic using standard Tarskian semantics (the thesis
of extensionality).
The multi-modal approach originating with C. I. Lewis, Carnap, Hintikka and Kripke has
some disadvantages. Operators apply only to formulas and not to singular terms so many
intuitively valid arguments cannot be captured. It is eclectic and incomplete rather than
based on a single intensional operator. According to Bealer, the higher-order approach has the
following disadvantages:
• Does not have a sound and complete semantics.
• Predicates can be linguistic subjects which leads us to consider two sorts of meaning
relation to avoid Frege’s ’a=a’/’a=b’ puzzle.
• Needs type theory to avoid paradoxes but this imposes implausible existence restrictions
on intensional entities.
• Division of variables into sorts makes it impossible to deal with ”transcendental” predi-
cates without violating Davidson’s learnability requirement.
• Requires possible-world semantics and commitment to non-actual possibilia.
We recommend the paper [3] for an interesting further discussion and defense of Bealer’s
Intensional Logic.
4 Bealer Decomposition
Definition 4.1 The language Lω consists of a countable ordered collection of variables x, y, z, ...
and n-ary predicate symbols (n ≥ 1) F,G,H, ..., with a distinguished binary predicate =, logical
connectives &,∼,∃ and the intensional abstraction operator [ ]x1...xn where x1...xn is a possibly
empty sequence of distinct variables.
We use the notation x̄ for a (possibly empty) sequence of distinct variables. We use lower-
case letters (possibly with subscripts) towards the end of the Latin alphabet to denote variables.
Definition 4.2 Formulas and terms of Lω are defined by simultaneous induction:
• Variables are terms.
• If t1, ..., tn are terms and F is n-ary predicate, then F (t1, ..., tn) is a formula.
• If A and B are formulas, v a variable, then (A&B),¬A and ∃v.A are formulas.
• If A is a formula and v1, ..., vm, 0 ≤ m, is a sequence of distinct variables, then [A]v1...vm
is a term.
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A term of the form [A]v1,...,vn is called an intensional abstract. Intensional abstracts of the form
[F (v1, ..., vn)]v1...vn are called elementary. Intensional abstracts [A]α where A is not an atomic
formula are called complex.
The intensional abstraction operator generalises the set-theoretic extension operator {x : A}.
The standard notions of bound and free variable, bound-variable renaming α-equivalence) as
well as a term being free for x in A carry over to Lω in the expected way (note that intensional
abstraction binds variables like quantifiers). Terms that differ only by bound variable renaming
will be called variants.
We will define a set of (partially defined) syntactic operations on intensional abstracts and
an algorithm to decompose an intensional abstract in a unique way in terms of such syntactic
operations, elementary intensional abstracts and variables.
A term [A]x̄ is normalized if all the variables in x̄ are free in A and they display the order
in which these variables first occur free.
If A is atomic then we call [A]x̄ a prime term if the variables in x̄ are free in A, independently
of the order.
Given an atomic formula F (t1, ..., tn) if a variable occurs free in more than one of the terms
ti then it is called a reflected variable. A prime term [A]x̄ is called a prime reflection term if x̄
contains a reflected variable in A.
Consider a prime term [F (t1, ..., [B]ȳ, ..., tj)]x̄ which is not a prime reflection term. If there
is a variable in x̄ which is free in [B]ȳ and all the previous arguments are variables in x̄, then
the prime term is a prime relativized predication term and such a variable is called a relativized
variable.
Consider a prime term [F (t1, ..., tk, ..., tj)]x̄ which is not a prime reflection term. If there is
term tk which is a variable not in x̄ or which contains no free variables which are in x̄ and all
the previous arguments are variables in x̄, then it is a prime absolute predication term.
These definitions allow us to divide all intensional abstracts into seven disjoint categories.
The following is clear:
Lemma 4.3 Given an intensional abstract [A]x̄ it falls into one and one only of the following
seven categories which depend only on A and x̄ independently of order (only on the underlying
set). They are also invariant under the renaming of bound variables.
1. Complex and x̄ contains variables not free in A.
2. Complex and all the variables in x̄ are free in A.
3. Not complex and x̄ contains variables not free in A.
4. Prime reflection term.
5. Prime relativized predication term.
6. Prime absolute predication term.
7. [A]x̄′ is elementary for some permutation x̄
′ of x̄.
Before defining Bealer decomposition we need the following considerations on permutations.
It is is clear that any permutation σn ∈ Sn(n ≥ 2) can be decomposed into permutations of
the form σnc = (1 2 ... n)(for n ≥ 3) and σni = (n − 1 n). However, we need a uniquely
defined decomposition defined as follows. Assume that our permutations are acting on sequences




n be a permutation of x1...xn. We use the notation σ
nx1....xn






equivalently the permutation which transforms the first sequence into the second) a uniquely
defined decomposition as follows:




i . Then let s









is the whole x′1...x
′
n we are done. Otherwise x
′
k+1 will correspond to a certain x in π
′x1...xn. If
x is the last element of this sequence then we choose σni , otherwise we chose σ
n
c . This process
terminates and the decomposition is clearly unique. Given a permutation σ (or two sequences
x̄, x̄′ of the same length), we denote its decomposition by β(σ)(or β(x̄, x̄′)).
Example 4.4 Consider x1x2x3x4 and x2x4x3x1. The the process yields σ
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Definition 4.5 The Bealer operations consists in eight syntactic operations defined on inten-
sional abstracts. These consists in six unary operations C, I,N, U,E,R, a binary operation K
and partially-defined binary operations Pn for n ≥ 0. These operations can be seen as defined
on equivalence classes modulo renaming of bound variables. Let [A]x̄ be an intensional abstract
with x̄ of length n. Then we have:
C[A]x̄ = [A]σnc x̄ n ≥ 3
I[A]x̄ = [A]σni x̄ n ≥ 2
N [A]x̄ = [¬A]x̄
U [A]x̄ = [∃xnA]x1...xn−1 n ≥ 1




′]x̄ variant of [B]ȳ
P0[A]x̄[B]ȳ = [A[[B]ȳ/xn]]x1...xn−1 where n ≥ 1 and [B]ȳ is free for xn in [A]x1...xn−1
Pn[A]x̄[B]ȳ = [A[[B]z̄/xn]]x1...xn−1w̄ where ȳ = z̄w̄,w̄ length n ≥ 1,[B]z̄ is free for xn in [A]x1...xn−1
Consider a sequence x̄ and a permutation x̄′. We associate to β(x̄, x̄′) a sequence Σ(x̄, x̄′)
of operations I and C obtained by replacing σni with I and σ
n
c with C in β(x̄, x̄
′). Thus in
the previous example we have Σ(x1x2x3x4, x2x4x3x1) = CCCI. This sequence is to interpreted
compositionally. In general we shall use the notation Σ for any (possibly empty) sequence of
operations C and I. We use the notation En to denote E composed n times. Also we shall use
the notation P n0 tt1...tn to mean P0...P0(P0tt1)t2....tn.
We now define Bealer decomposition.
Definition 4.6 Given an intensional abstract [A]x̄ or variable x the Bealer decomposition
B[A]x̄ is defined inductively as follows:
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• Suppose [A]x̄ belongs to categories 1 or 3. And let x̄′ be a permutation of x̄ of the form
ȳz̄ so that [A]ȳ is normalized and z̄ (of length m) consists of the variables in x̄ that do
not occur free in A in order of their occurrence in x̄. Then B[A]x̄ := Σ(x̄, x̄′)EmB[A]ȳ.
• Suppose [A]x̄ belongs to category 2 and is not normalized. And let x̄′ be a permutation
of x̄ so that [A]x̄′ is normalized. Then B[A]x̄ := Σ(x̄, x̄′)B[A]x̄′ .
• Suppose the term belongs to category 2 and is normalized. Then we have
B[A&B]x̄ := KB[A]x̄B[B]x̄
B[¬A]x̄ := NB[A]x̄
B[∃vA]x̄ := UB[A]x̄v where v is the first variable not in A or x̄.
• Let the term belong to category 4. Of the reflected variables in x̄ consider the one v with
the right-most occurrence and let be t the right-most argument of A in which v has a free
occurrence. Let w be the alphabetically earliest variable not occurring in A or x̄. Let x̄′
be the permutation of x̄ such that [F (t1, ..., tn)]x̄′ is normalized and consider ȳv where ȳ
is x̄′ with v removed. Then
B[F (t1, ..., tn)]x̄ := Σ(x̄, ȳv)RB[F (...t[w/v]...)]ȳvw
• Let the term belong to category 6 and let t be the argument which is not a variable in x̄ or
which contains no free variables which are in x̄ and such that all the previous arguments
are variables in x̄. Let v be the alphabetically earliest variable not occurring in A or x̄..
Let x̄′ be the permutation of x̄ such that [F (t1, ..., t, ..., tn)]x̄′ is normalized. Then
B[F (..., t, ...)]x̄ := Σ(x̄, x̄′)P0B[F (..., v, ...)]x̄′vBt
• Let the term belong to category 5. Then it is a prime term [F (t1, ..., [B]ȳ, ..., tj)]x̄, where
there is a variable in x̄ which is free in [B]ȳ and such that all the previous arguments are
variables in x̄. Let z̄ be the sequence, as they first occur, of all m free variables in [B]ȳ
which are in x̄. Let v be the alphabetically earliest variable not occurring in A or x̄. Then
if x̄′ is the normalizing permutation of x̄ it is of the form x̄′′z̄x̄′′′. Let w̄ = x̄′′x̄′′′z̄. Then
B[F (..., [B]ȳ, ...)]x̄ := Σ(x̄, w̄)PmB[F (..., v, ...)]x̄′′x̄′′′v,B[B]ȳz̄
• Finally let the term be in category 7 and let x̄′ be such that [F (x1, ..., xn)]x̄′ is elementary.
B[F (x1, ..., xn)]x̄ := Σ(x̄, x̄′)[F (x1, ..., xn)]x̄′
• In the case of a variable we have Bx := x.
It is easy to check that this decomposition is well-defined and unique modulo renaming of
bound variables. Bealer decomposition transforms an intensional abstract into an expression
(in Polish notation) involving the eight Bealer operations, elementary abstracts and variables.
Example 4.7 Consider the term [¬F (x, [G(x, y)])]y. Then
B[¬F (x, [G(x, y)])]y = NB[F (x, [G(x, y)])]y = NP0B[F (v, [G(x, y)])]yvx
= NP0IB[F (v, [G(x, y)])]vyx = NP0IP1B[F (v, w)]vwB[G(x, y)]yx
= NP0IP1B[F (v, w)]vwP0B[G(u, y)]yuxx = NP0IP1B[F (v, w)]vwP0IB[G(u, y)]uyxx
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The following observation will be used further ahead:
Lemma 4.8 Let [F (t1, ..., tn)]x̄ be a prime term. Then its Bealer decomposition has the form
Γ1...Γm[F (v1, ..., vn)]v1...vnBt′i1 ....Bt
′
im
where the Γi consist in sequences of the form
Σ1RΣ2RΣ3...Σl−1RΣlPni
and t′ik = sȳ where s = tik and if s = [A]z̄ then sȳ is [A]z̄ȳ where ȳ is the sequence of free
variables (as they first occur) of s which are in x̄. If s is a variable then ȳ is empty and t′ik = s.
5 The Logic of Necessity
We now consider Bealer’s axiomatic system T1 over the language Lω. The conception of
intensionality behind T1 is that there is only one necessary truth and that the intensional ab-
stracts of necessarily equivalent formulas are equal and interchangeable. We define necessitation
in terms of equality of intensional abstracts:
A ≡df [A] = [[A] = [A]]
.
Here [[A] = [A]] represents the one necessary truth.
A Hilbert system for T1 consists of the following axioms and rules:
1. All propositional tautologies
2. (Inst) ∀v.A(v)→ A(t), t free for v in A.
3. (QImp) ∀x.(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀x.B), x not free in A
4. (Id) x = x
5. (L) x = y → (A(x, x)↔ A(x, y)), y free for x in the positions it replaces x.
6. [A]x̄ 6= [B]ȳ, for x̄ and ȳ of different lengths
7. [A]x̄ = [A
′]x̄′ (equality modulo renaming bound variables)
8. (B) [A]x̄ = [B]x̄ ↔ ∀x̄.(A↔ B)
9. (T) A→ A
10. (K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
11. (S5) ♦A→ ♦A
1. (MP) From A and A→ B infer B
2. (N) From A infer A
3. (Gen) From A infer ∀x.A
Here, as usual, ♦A =df ¬¬A.
In order to prove soundness and completeness it is convenient to replace axioms (L),(B) and
(S5) with:
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1. (L’) x = y → (A(x, x)→ A(x, y)), y free for x in the positions it replaces x, A atomic.
2. (B1) (A↔ B)↔ [A] = [B]
3. (B2) ∀v.[A(v)]x̄ = [B(v)]x̄ ↔ [A(x)]x̄v = [B(v)]x̄v
4. (S5’) x 6= y → x 6= y
The rest of this section is devoted to proving that we obtain equivalent axiomatic systems.
Lemma 5.1 In T1 we have:
i) ` x = y → x = y
ii) ` ¬x = y ↔ x 6= y
Proof. For i), by the identity axiom we have x = x. Hence using the necessitation rule we get
x = x
which is
[x = x] = [[x = x] = [x = x]]
We denote this expression by B(x, x). Using B(x, x) in (L)
x = y → A(x, x)↔ A(x, y)
which is equivalent to A(x, x)→ (x = y → A(x, y)) we obtain as desired.
For ii), take the converse of the (T) instance x = y → x = y to obtain x 6= y → ¬x = y.
For the other direction simply take the converse of i)
Lemma 5.2 We obtain an equivalent system if in T1 we replace (S5) with
(*) x 6= y → x 6= y.
Proof. Assuming (*), since ♦A is by definition ¬([¬A] = [[¬A] = [¬A]]) we get (S5) immedi-
ately.
In the other direction take the (S5) instance
¬¬¬x = y → ¬¬¬x = y
that is,
(**) ¬x = y → ¬x = y
Now by ii) of the previous lemma we have
¬x = y → ¬x = y
Applying necessitation and using (K) we get
¬x = y → ¬x = y
and combining with (**) we get as desired.
We will use the standard properties of S5 modal logic:
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Lemma 5.3 In T1 we have
i) ` A→ ♦A
ii) ` A→ ♦A
iii) ♦A→ A
iv) If ` A→ B then we can derive ` ♦A→ ♦B
v) We have ` ♦A→ B iff ` A→ B
Proof. For i) take the converse of the (T) instance ¬A → ¬A. For ii) combine i) and (S5).
For iii) take the converse of the (S5) instance ¬♦¬A→ ¬♦¬A and use (T). For iv) take the
converse of the premise, apply (T) and take the converse again. Finally v) follows easily from
(T), iv), iii) and ii).
Lemma 5.4 ` ∀v.A(v)→ ∀v.A(v)
Proof. Take the (Ins) instance
∀v.A(v)→ A(v)




Since v is not free on the left side of the implication we can apply (QImp) and modus ponens
to obtain
∀v.A(v)→ ∀v.A(v)
Lemma 5.5 We have the Barcan Formula ` ∀v.A(v)→ ∀v.A(v).
Proof. We have by (Ins)
∀v.A→ A
Applying ♦ yields, by lemma 5.3 iii) and iv):
♦∀v.A→ ♦A→ A
Hence by generalization, (QImp) and modus ponens:
♦∀v.A→ ∀v.A
which again by lemma 5.3 yields
∀v.A→ ∀v.A
We can now prove:
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Lemma 5.6 We obtain an equivalent system to T1 if instead of (B) take
(B’1) (A↔ B)↔ ([A] = [B])
(B’2) ∀v.([A(v)]x̄ = [B(v)]x̄)↔ [A(v)]x̄v = [B(v)]x̄v
Proof. Using Barcan’s formula and its converse it is easy to see that (B’1) and (B’2) follow
from (B).
Assume (B’1) and (B’2). We must show that
[A]x̄ = [B]x̄ ↔ ∀x̄.(A↔ B)
Let x̄ = x̄′v.
Since [A]x̄′v = [B]x̄′v ↔ ∀v.([A(v)]x̄′ = [B(v)]x̄′) using (B’2) repeatedly we get
[A]x̄v = [B]x̄v ↔ ∀x̄, v.([A(v)] = [B(v)])
Using (B’1) we get
[A]x̄ = [B]x̄ ↔ ∀x̄.(A↔ B)
Using repeatedly Barcan’s formula and its converse we get as desired.
Finally:
Lemma 5.7 We obtain an equivalent system to T1 when the Leibniz axiom (L) is restricted
to atomic predicates and restricted to the form (L’) x = y → (A(x, x)→ A(x, y)).
Proof. L obviously implies (L’) as a particular case. In the other direction we first show that
x = y → (A(x, x) ← A(x, y)). We have that x = y → (A(x, x) → A(x, y)) and A(x, y) arises
from A(x, x) by replacing some occurrences of x by y. So A(x, x) arises from replacing some
occurrences of y in A(x, y) by x. Hence we have y = x→ (A(x, y)→ A(x, x)). Also from (L’)
we can derive x = y → y = x and using this we get as desired. We can now proceed inductively
on the structure of the formula A. The case of negation is immediate. For conjunction we
use the tautology (A → B) → (C → D) → (A&C → B&D) and for quantification we use
generalisation, (QImp) and modus ponens.
This lemma justifies that ”there is only one necessary truth”.
Lemma 5.8 We have ∀x, y.[x = x] = [y = y].
Proof. We have x = x↔ y = y. We apply necessitation and (B’1) and then generalisation to
get as desired.
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6 The Logic of Definition
The logic T1 is insufficient in many instances.
Lemma 6.1 In T1 if ` W (x, [∃y(T (y) & ¬S(y))]) and ` ∀y(S(y)↔ T (y)) then
` W (x, [∃y(T (y) & ¬T (y))]).
Proof. We only need to show that [∃y(T (y) & ¬S(y))] = [∃y(T (y) & ¬T (y))], that is, by (B),
(∃y(T (y) & ¬S(y)) ↔ ∃y(T (y) & ¬T (y))). From the second hypothesis we get ` S(y) ↔
T (y) and using the tautology:
(T (y)↔ S(y))→ ((T (y) & ¬S(y))↔ (T (y) & ¬T (y)))
we get easily
∀y(T (y)↔ S(y))→ ∃y((T (y) & ¬S(y))↔ (T (y) & ¬T (y)))
and the result follows from necessitation, (K), modus ponens and (B).
To avoid this in our intensional logic we accept only one implication in axiom (B).
Bealer’s logic T2 is given the following Hilbert axiomatic system:
1. All propositional tautologies
2. (Ins) ∀x.A(x)→ A(t), t free for v in A.
3. (QImp) ∀x.(A→ B)→ (A→ ∀x.B), x not free in A
4. (Id) x = x
5. (L) x = y → (A(x, x)↔ A(x, y)), y free for x in the positions it replaces x.
6. [A]x̄ 6= [B]ȳ, x̄ and ȳ of different lengths
7. [A]x̄ = [A
′]x̄′ (equality modulo renaming bound variables)
8. [A]x̄ = [B]x̄ → (A↔ B)
9. [A]x̄ 6= [B]ȳ, non-elementary terms belonging to different categories.
10. Let t′ = Bt and r′ = Br where B is the first operation in the Bealer decomposition of t′
and r′. Then t = r ↔ t′ = r′
11. Let t = Bt′r′ and r = Bt′′r′′ where B is the first operation in the Bealer decomposition
of t and r. The t = r ↔ t′ = t′′&r′ = r′′.
12. If [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = s and G occurs in s then [G(y1, ..., ym)]y1...ym 6= t whenever F
occurs in t (Non-circularity)
1. (MP) From A and A→ B infer B
2. (TGen) Suppose that F does not occur in A(v). If ` A([F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn) then we can
infer ` A(t) whenever t is complex, of arity n and free for v in A.
3. (Gen) From A infer ∀x.A
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7 Model Structures
Let F = ∅ and T = {∅}. A model M consists of a set D with a decomposition into the
union of disjoint sets Di for i ≥ −1, a distinguished element id ∈ D2, a set H of functions
H whose domain is D and such that H is the identify on D−1 and on D0 has range {T, F}
and on Di has range P(Di) where Di = D × ... × D (i terms) for i ≥ 1. All these functions
must satisfy H(id) = {(x, y) : x = y}. There is a distinguished function G representing the
actual extension. Furthermore we have unary (partial) operations n, e, u, c, i, r and binary (par-
tial) operations k, pn with n ≥ 0. These operations restrict to the following domains and ranges:
n : Di → Di, i ≥ 0
e : Di → Di+1, i ≥ 0
u : Di → Di−1, i ≥ 1 and u : D0 → D0.
c : Di → Di, i ≥ 3
i : Di → Di, i ≥ 2
r : Di → Di−1, i ≥ 2
a : Di ×Di → Di, i ≥ 0
pn : Di ×Dj → Di+n−1, i ≥ 1, j ≥ n
We define inductively pn0 (d, x1, ..., xn) = p0(p
n−1
0 (d, x2, ..., xn−1), x1) and p
1
0(d, x1) = p0(d, x1).
Furthermore we have the important constraints on how the functions in H relate to these
operations. Here d denotes a suitable member of Di. For all H ∈ H we must have:
d′ ∈ Hn(d) iff d′ /∈ Hd
(x1, ..., xi, xi+1) ∈ He(d) iff (x1, ..., xi) ∈ Hd
(x1, ..., xi−1) ∈ Hu(d) iff there is a xi such that (x1, ..., xi) ∈ Hd
(x1, ..., xi−1, xi) ∈ Hc(d) iff (xi, x1, ..., xi−1) ∈ Hd
(x1, ..., xi−1, xi) ∈ Hi(d) iff (x1, ..., xi, xi−1) ∈ Hd
(x1, ..., xi−1, xi) ∈ Hr(d) iff (x1, ..., xi, xi) ∈ Hd
d′′ ∈ Hk(d, d′) iff d′′ ∈ Hd and d′′ ∈ Hd′
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hp0(d, d′) iff (x1, ..., xn, d′) ∈ Hd
(x1, ..., xi−1, y1, .., yn) ∈ Hpn(d, d′) iff (x1, ..., xi−1, pn0 (d′, y1, ..., yn)) ∈ Hd
Here we consider also the 0-tuple as being ∅. Notice that elements of D0 are propositions
seen as objective entities according to their meaning. The extension functions H determine
their Boolean values which are T = {∅} and F = ∅.
Definition 7.1 Given a model M, an interpretation I assigns i-ary predicate elements of Di
and = to id. An assignment A assigns to variables elements in D.
Bealer decomposition is crucial to define the denotation of a term relative to a model,
interpretation and assignment.
Definition 7.2 Given M, I and A we define the denotation DI,A,Mt of a term t of Lω as
follows. If t is a variable then it is A(t). If t is an elementary term [F (v1, ..., vn)]v1...vn then it
is I(F ). Otherwise, consider the Bealer decomposition Bt of t. If Bt = Bt′ (respectively Bt′t′′)
where B is a Bealer operation then we define inductively
DI,A,Mt = bDI,A,Mt
′ (respectively DI,A,Mt = bDI,A,Mt
′DI,A,Mt
′′)
where b is i, c, e, u, n, r, k, pn if B is I, C,E, U,N,R,K, Pn respectively.
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Definition 7.3 We say that a formula A is true forM, I and A (we also write TI,A,M(A) ) if
GDI,A,M[A] = T .
It is simple to see that the denotation is invariant modulo renaming bound variables. From
now one, we will in most cases drop the subscripts in DI,A,M and assume we a working with a
given model , interpretation and assignment.
We are now interested in special classes of models for which T1 and T2 are sound and
complete.
Definition 7.4 A model M is called type 1 if for all i ≥ −1, x, y ∈ Di
(type 1 model condition) ∀H ∈ H H(x) = H(x)→ x = y
A model M is called type 2 if the operations are:
1. one-to-one
2. disjoint on their ranges
3. and non-cycling
By the first two conditions each element of the model has a unique (possibly infinite) decom-
position in terms of the operations. This decomposition is a tree having leaves indecomposable
elements. The non-cycling condition means that the same element cannot appear in more than
one place in the tree.
A formula A is T1-valid (we write `T1 A) iff A is true for all type 1 modelM, interpretation
I and assignment A. In the same way a formula A is T2-valid (`T2 A) iff A is true for all type
2 model M, interpretation I and assignment A.
Note that for type 2 models only G is relevant. The type 1 condition restricts the possible
operations on the model.
Example 7.5 A standard model for Kelley-Morse set theory furnishes an example of a type 1
model with a single extensional function. Type 1 models can be seen as generalised set theory
models with a plurality of membership predicates ∈H such that the axiom of extensionality is
only valid globally. Consider a language with a single unary predicate M . We can construct a
type 2 model with no constants, D0, D1 and Di = ∅ for i ≥ 2.
Lemma 7.6 Let v be an externally quantifiable variable in [B(v)]x̄ and let t be free for v in
[B(v)]x̄. Consider any model structure M and any interpretation I and assignment A. Let A′
be an assignment which is just like A except that A′(v) = Dt. Then
DA′ [B(v)]x̄ = D[B(t)]x̄
Proof. By induction on the Bealer decomposition of [B(v)]x̄. The base case is either an ele-
mentary abstract (in which case there are no externally quantifiable variables) or else a variable.
If is it not v we are done and if it is v the result is trivial.
Suppose that [B(v)]x̄ = Bs(v) were B is some unary operation. If B is I, C, N , U or E
then t is still free for v in d(v) and hence by the induction hypothesis DA′s(v) = Ds(t) so that
DA′ [B(v)]x̄ = bDA′s(v) = bDs(t) = DBs(t) where b is the corresponding model function. If
B is R then there is a problem that s has a new bound variable which may occur in t in such
a way that t is no longer free for v in s. But we may rename this bound variable to obtain
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an α-equivalent term s′ where this problem does not occur. Note that the substitution does
not effect which of the seven syntactic categories an intensional abstract belongs to. Suppose
[B(v)]x̄ = Bs(v)s
′(v) for a binary operation B. If B is A then t remains free for v in s(v) and
s(v′) and the previous argument applies. If B is Pk then we have the problem of the new bound
variable in the first argument possibly occurring in t. We thus need to use α-equivalence so t
remains free for v in s(v). In the case of 0-predication we have
DA′ [B(v)]x̄ = p0(DA′ [B
′(v)]x̄w, DA′s
′(v))















In the k-predication case for k > 0 we have, for s′(v) = [C(v)]ȳz̄ where z̄ are relativized
variables of [C(v)]ȳ in [B(v)]x̄
DA′ [B(v)]x̄ = pk(DA′ [B
′(v)]x̄′w, DA′ [C(v)]ȳz̄)
where x̄′ is obtained from x̄ by omitting z̄. The result now follows easily from induction.
Lemma 7.7 For all M and I, A we have D[A]x1...xk ∈ Dk
Proof. This follows by easy induction from the definition of D and the model operations.
Given a sequence of Bealer operations of the form Σ we denote its associated n-permutation
by σ. This permutation can also be applied to n-tuples (x1, ...xn) and we denote such an
application by σ(x1, ..., xn) just as we denote its application to variable sequences by σx1....xn.
We will make frequent use of the following:
Lemma 7.8 For any permutation σ of (x1, ..., xn) we have
σ(v1, ..., vn) ∈ HD[F ]σx1,...,xn ↔ (v1, ..., vn) ∈ HD[F ]x1...xn
Proof. Let the Bealer decomposition of [F ]x1...xn be Σ1B[F ]x′1...x′n where B[F ]x′1...x′n does not
begin with C or I. Then Bealer decomposition of [F ]σx1,...,xn will be of the form Σ2B[F ]x′1...x′n .
By the definition of denotation and model we have for any (x1, ..., xn):
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[F ]x1...xn iff σ1(x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[F ]x′1...x′n
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[F ]σx1,...,xn iff σ2(x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[F ]x′1...x′n
where x′1...x
′




n = σ2σ(x1, ..., xn) and hence σ = σ
−1
2 σ1 and σ1 =
σ2σ.
Hence given (x1, ...xn) we have (x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[F ]x1...xn iff σ1(x1, ..., xn) = σ2σ(x1, ..., xn) ∈
HD[F ]x′1...x′n iff σ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[F ]σx1,...,xn .
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Lemma 7.9 For all I,A,M, F (t1, ..., tn) is true iff (Dt1, ..., Dtn) ∈ I(F ).
Proof. By definition F (t1, ..., tn) is true iff GD([F (t1, ..., tn)]) = T . But
[F (t1, ..., tn)] = P0[F (v1, ..., tn)]v1t1 = P0Pp[F (v1, v2, ..., tn)]v1v2t2t1 = P
n
0 [F (v1, ..., vn)]v1...vntn...t2t1
hence by definition GD([F (t1, ..., tn)]) = T iff
Dt1 ∈ Gp0(p0(...p0(D[F (v1, ..., vn)]v1...vn , Dtn), ..., Dt3), Dt2)
iff
(Dt1, Dt2) ∈ Gp0(p0(...p0(D[F (v1, ..., vn)]v1...vn , Dtn)..., Dt3)
and so on until obtaining
(Dt1, ..., Dtn) ∈ D[F (v1, ..., vn)]v1...vn = I(F )
Lemma 7.10 TIAM(A&B) iff TIAM(A) and TIAM(B). Also TIAM(¬A) iff it is not the case
that TIAM(A).
This is an immediate consequence of the definition of TIAM.
8 Soundness of T1
In this section we work in a type 1 model M. We will use Polish notation for the model
operations and omit parenthesis when possible. We note first that Lemma 7.9 (for the case of
equality) and Lemma 7.10 yields immediately:
Lemma 8.1 For all models we have propositional tautologies, (MP), (Id) and (L’) are sound.
It is immediate by lemma 7.7 that axiom 6 is sound and the soundness of axiom 7 is obvious.
The following is of central importance
Lemma 8.2 (Bealer’s lemma) Let v be free in [A(v)]x̄. Then for all M of type 1 and I, A be
an interpretation and assignment. Then
D[A(v)]x̄ = p0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
Note that when we write (x1, ..., xn) we include the case n = 0 in which case the sequence
is taken to be the empty set ∅.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the Bealer decomposition of [A(v)]x̄.
Let B[A(v)]x̄ = KB[B(v)]x̄B[C(v)]x̄. Then
D[A(v)]x̄ = kD[B(v)]x̄D[C(v)]x̄ = kp0D[B(v)]x̄vA(v)p0D[C(v)]x̄vA(v)
by the induction hypothesis. We use the type 1 condition to show that
kp0D[B(v)]x̄vA(v)p0D[C(v)]x̄vA(v) = p0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
For any H let (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hkp0D[B(v)]x̄vA(v)p0D[C(v)]x̄vA(v). Then this is equivalent
to
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hp0D[B(v)]x̄vA(v) and (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hp0D[C(v)]x̄vA(v)
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which is equivalent to
(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[B(v)]x̄v and (x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[C(v)]x̄v
The Bealer decomposition of [A(v)]x̄v is ΣK[B(v)]x̄′ [C(v)]x̄′ were Σ is such that x̄′ = σx̄v is
the normalised permutation of x̄v for [A(v)]x̄v. But then the above condition is equivalent to
σ(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[B(v)]x̄′ and σ(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[C(v)]x̄′
which is equivalent to σ(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ HkDB[(v)]x̄′DC[(v)]x̄′ . Let s be the com-
position of operations corresponding to Σ. Then the previous condition is equivalent to
(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ HskDB[(v)]x̄′DC[(v)]x̄′ = HD[A(v)]x̄v. But this is equivalent to (x1, ..., xn) ∈
Hp0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v). Hence the conclusion follows from the type 1 condition.
Let B[A(v)]x̄ = NB[A′(v)]x̄ where A(v) = ¬A′(v). We have D[A(v)]x̄ = nD[A′(v)]x̄ =
np0D[A
′(v)]x̄vA(v) by the induction hypothesis. We use the type 1 condition to show that
np0D[A
′(v)]x̄vA(v) = p0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
Then for any H,
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hnp0D[A′(v)]x̄vA(v) iff (x1, ..., xn) /∈ Hp0D[A′(v)]x̄vA(v)
iff (x1, ..., xn,A(v)) /∈ H[A′(v)]x̄v
Let x̄′ be the normalised sequence for [A′(v)]x̄v and σ the associated permutation. Then the
above condition holds iff
σ(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) /∈ H[A′(v)]x̄′ iff σ(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ Hn[A′(v)]x̄′
The Bealer decomposition of [A(v)]x̄v is ΣN [A
′(v)]x̄′ where σ corresponds to Σ soD[A(v)]x̄v =
snD[A′(v)]x̄′ where s is the composition of model operation corresponding to Σ. Hence we
have σ(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ Hn[A′(v)]x̄′ iff (x1, ...., xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[A(v)]x̄v iff (x1, ..., xn) ∈
Hp0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v) and our conclusion follows from the type 1 model condition.
Let B[A(v)]x̄ = U [A′(v)]x̄w where A(v) = ∃w.A′(v). Then D[A(v)]x̄ = uD[A′(v)]x̄w =
up0D[A
′(v)]x̄wvA(v) by induction. We show that up0D[A′(v)]x̄wvA(v) = p0[A(v)]x̄vA(v). Take
a H. Then
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hup0D[A′(v)]x̄wvA(v) iff there is y such that (x1, ..., xn, y) ∈ Hp0D[A′(v)]x̄wvA(v)
iff there is a y such that (x1, ..., xn, y,A(v)) ∈ HD[A′(v)]x̄wv
As previously let x̄′ = σx̄v be the normalized sequence for [A(v)]x̄v. The Bealer decom-
position of [A(v)]x̄v is ΣUB[A′(v)]x̄′w so p0[A(v)]x̄vA(v) = p0suD[A′(v)]x̄′wA(v). The above
condition is equivalent to
there is a y such that (x′1, ..., x
′
n+1, y) ∈ HD[A′(v)]x̄′w




which is equivalent to
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(x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ HsuD[A′(v)]x̄′w iff (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hp0suD[A′(v)]x̄′wA(v) = Hp0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
and the result follows from the type 1 model condition.
Let B[A(v)]x̄ = EB[A(v)]x̄′ with x̄ = x̄′y and y does not occur free in A(v). We have
D[A(v)]x̄ = eD[A(v)]x̄′ = ep0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v) by induction. As previously take a H. Then
(x1, ...., xn) ∈ Hep0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v) iff (x1, ...., xn−1) ∈ Hp0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v)
iff (x1, ...., xn−1,A(v)) ∈ H[A(v)]x̄′v
The Bealer decomposition of [A(v)]x̄v is ΣB[A(v)]z̄ = ΣEB[A(v)]z̄′ where z̄ = σx̄v is the
normalizing permutation which puts v in its proper place and z̄′ drops the last element of z̄
(not v and the same as xn). Put z̄
′ = σ′x̄′v and let σ′ correspond to composition of model
operations s′. Then the above condition is equivalent to
(x1, ...., xn−1,A(v)) ∈ Hs′D[A(v)]σ′x̄′v = Hs′D[A(v)]z̄′
which is equivalent to
(x1, ...., xn−1, xn,A(v)) ∈ Hies′D[A(v)]z̄′ = HseD[A(v)]z̄′
which is turn is equivalent to:
(x1, ...., , xn) ∈ Hp0seD[A(v)]z̄′A(v) = Hp0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
and the result follows as in the other cases.
Let B[A(v)]x̄ = BB[A(v)]x̄′ with B equal to C or I where x̄′ = σbx̄ for b equal to c or i.
Then D[A(v)]x̄ = bD[A(v)]x̄′ = bp0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v) using the induction hypothesis. We use the
type 1 condition to show that
bp0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v) = Dp0[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
For any H we have
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hbp0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v) iff (x′1, ..., x′n) ∈ Hp0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v)
where (x1, ..., xn) = σb(x1, ..., xn). But
(x′1, ..., x
′
n) ∈ Hp0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v) iff (x′1, ..., x′n,A(v)) ∈ H[A(v)]x̄′v
iff (x1, ..., xn,A(v)) ∈ H[A(v)]x̄v iff (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hp0[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
Hence by the type 1 model condition we get that bp0[A(v)]x̄′vA(v) = Dp0[A(v)]x̄vA(v).
Now let B[A(v)]x̄ = RB[A′(v)]x̄w. Then [A(v)]x̄ has a reflected variable and hence so does
[A(v)]x̄v (it is also belongs to category 4 and is a prime reflection term). We distinguish between
two cases. Either v is the right-most reflected variable or it is not. Assume that is is not. Let t
be the right-most argument in which t occurs. Then the right-most reflected variable is the last
element xn of x̄. We have D[A(v)]x̄ = rp0D[A
′(v)]x̄wvA(v) by induction, were A′(v) is obtained
from A(v) by replacing the argument t with t[w/xn]. Fix H. Then
(x1, ...xn) ∈ Hrp0D[A′(v)]x̄wvA(v) iff (x1, ...., xn, xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[′A(v)]x̄wv
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Now the Bealer decomposition of [A(v)]x̄v in this case will be ΣRB[A′(v)]x̄′w. Here x̄v = σx̄′.
x̄′ moves v to its proper place so that x̄′ is the normalized permutation of x̄v except that
xn is placed at the end, being the reflected variable with right-most occurrence. We have
D[A(v)]x̄v = srD[A










which is turn is equivalent to
(x1, ...., xn,A(v)) ∈ HsrD[A′(v)]x̄′w
which is finally equivalent to
(x1, ...., xn) ∈ Hp0srD[A′(v)]x̄′wA(v) = Hp0D[A(v)]x̄vA(v)
and the result follows as in the other cases. Now for the second case: v is a reflected variable
with the right-most occurrence. Let the right-most argument in which it occurs be t. The
Bealer decomposition of [A(v)]x̄v in this case will be ΣRB[A′(v)]x̄′vw where A′(v) is obtained
from A(v) by replacing t with t[w/v]. Here x̄v = σx̄′v. x̄′ moves xn back to its proper place
so that x̄′ is a normalized sequence. Now either in [A′(v)]x̄′vw v is still the right-most reflected
variable or else it is xn. If v it is still the right-most reflected variable we continue with the
Bealer decomposition until we arrive at term in which the right-most reflected variable is xn.
The decomposition will be of the form:
[A(v)]x̄v = Σ1RΣ2R....ΣkRB[A(k)(v)]z̄wk
where z̄ (normalized except for wk being placed at the end) contains the elements of x̄,v and
new variables w1, ..., wk−1. Here [A
(k)(v)]z̄wk is now as the previous case (modulo a permutation).
It is easy to see that





Here (x′1, ..., x
′
n+k+1) follows the sequence of z̄wk, having xi for xi (here we are abusing
notation) but has x′k = A(v) whenever x′k is a wi or v.
Now D[A(k)(v)]z̄wk = sD[A
(k)(v)]ūxn = srD[A
(k)
0 (v)]ūxnw where ū is the normalized permu-
tation of z̄wk but with xn omitted. Hence
(*) (x′1, ..., x
′
n+k+1) ∈ HD[A(k)(v)]z̄wk iff (x′′1, ..., x′′n+k, xn, xn) ∈ HD[A
(k)
0 (v)]ūxnw
where the x′′i follows the normalized sequence but with xn omitted and A
(k)
0 (v) has the
right-most argument t in which xn occurs replaced with t[w/xn]. Now we have by induction,
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[A(v)]x̄ iff (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Hrp0[A1(v)]x̄wvA(v)
iff (x1, ..., xn, xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[A1(v)]x̄wv
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where A1 has the right-most argument t in which xn appears replaced by t[w/xn]. Now











(x1, ..., xn, xn,A(v)) ∈ HD[A1(v)]x̄wv iff (q1, ...., qn+k+2) ∈ HD[A(k)1 (v)]q̄wk
Here q̄ is the normalized permutation of x̄wv except that wk is moved to the end. It has
new variables w1, ..., wk1 . (q1, ..., qn+k+2) follows this sequence and for v or wi it has A and for
w it has xn. It is clear that A
(k)
1 (v) is the same as A
(k)
0 (v). Examining (*) and noticing that
applying a permutation we have
(x′′1, ..., x
′′
n+k, xn, xn) ∈ HD[A
(k)
0 (v)]ūxnw iff (q1, ...., qn+k+2) ∈ HD[A
(k)
0 (v)]q̄wk
and the result follows.
Finally, consider the case in which B[A(v)]x̄ = PnB[A′(v)]ūwtȳ. Here tȳ means that if t = [B]z̄
then tȳ = [B]z̄ȳ or else t is a variable and ȳ is the empty sequence. Let the argument in A(v)
which w replaced be t. Here x̄ = x̄′x̄′′ȳ is normalized except that the sequence ȳ of variables
in x̄ which are free in t are placed at the end. All arguments before t are variables in x̄. So





Here x̄′q̄ is the normalized permutation of x̄v and the k new variables wk but with the
sequence ȳ′ of variables of q̄ which occur free in t placed at the end. ȳ′ is either equal to ȳ or
contains in addition v. Notice how x̄′ is not affected by the permutations. For clarity, we wrote
the last permutation as a composition. If v is not reflected then we have only Σ which puts v

















where j is either 0 and v is in p̄ or else is 1 and v is in ȳ′. Here the (p1, ..., pb+k) is permutation
of the x′′i and wi (and possibly v) corresponding to the normalized sequence of these variables
and which has v for wi.















c(Dtȳ, y1, ...y1)) ∈ HD[A′1(v)]x̄x̄′w = Hp0D[A′1(v)]x̄′x̄′′wvA(v)








c(Dtȳ, y1, ...y1),A(v))) ∈ HD[A′1(v)]x̄′x̄′′wv









where q̄ consists of variables of x̄′′, w, v and k new variables wk.








c(Dtȳ, y1, ...y1),A(v))) ∈ Hs′Rs′D[A′(k−1)(v)]x̄′q̄
which is equivalent to
(**) (x′1, ..., x
′
a, r1, ...., rs) ∈ HD[A′(k−1)(v)]x̄′q̄
where (r1, ..., rs) corresponds to the sequence q̄ with v and wk corresponding to A(v) and w








b , y1, ..., yc) ∈ Hp0D[A(v)]x̄x̄′ȳvA(v)







b , y1, ..., yc,A(v)) ∈ HD[A(v)]x̄x̄′ȳv = HsrsD[A(k)(v)]x̄′p̄ȳ′




















where (e1, ..., eb+k+1) corresponds to the sequence p̄ and has A(v) corresponding to wk and
(y′1, ..., y
′
c+1) corresponds to ȳ




a, e1, ..., eb+k, p
c+1







It is easy to check that by induction we have






0(Dtȳv, y1, ..., yc))A(v) = pc0(Dtȳ, y1, ..., yc)
Inspecting (**) , noticing that [A(k)
′
(v)]x̄′p̄w = [A
′(k)(v)]x̄′p̄w (modulo renaming bound vari-
ables) and applying a permutation we get as desired.
Lemma 8.3 TIAM(∃v.A) iff there is an assignment A′ like A except perhaps for what it assigns
to v and such that TIA′M(A(v)).
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g that v occurs free in A. We have TIAM(∃v.A) iff GD([∃v.A]) = T iff
GuD[A]v = T . The last condition is equivalent to the existence of a x ∈ D such that
x ∈ GD[A(v)]v
Let A′ be like A but with A′(v) = x. We must show that GDA′ [A(v)] = T . Notice that
DA′ [A(v)]v = D[A(v)]v. By the proof of Bealer’s lemma (note that we are not using the type
1 condition) we have that:
GDA′ [A(v)] = T iff Gp0D[A(v)]vA′(v) = T
Hence we must show that Gp0D[A(v)]vA′(v) = T . But this is equivalent to A′(v) ∈
GD[A(v)]v and the result follows since A′(v) = x. The other direction is similar.
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Hence if TIAM(∀v.A(v)) then for any assignment A′ which only differs at most on v we have
that TIA′M(A(v)). Hence lemma 8.3 yields:
Lemma 8.4 For any models we have (Inst)  ∀v.A(v)→ A(t) where t is free for v in A.
Likewise we have
Lemma 8.5 For any models we have (QImp)  ∀v.(A → B(v)) → (A → ∀v.B(v)) where v
does not occur free in A.
Proof. Assume TIAM(∀v.A(→ B(v)) . Then for all assignment A′ differing from A at most
on v we have that
(*) TIA′M(A→ B(v))
We must show that TIAM(A→ ∀v.B(v)). Assume then that TIAM(A). We must show that
TIAM(A→ ∀v.B(v)). Take any assignment A′ differing from A at most on v. Since v does not
occur in A we have that TIA′M(A). Hence by (*) we get that TIA′M(∀v.A(v)). Since this holds
for any A′ we get the conclusion by lemma 8.3.
Similarly we get the soundness of the (Gen) rule:
Lemma 8.6 For any models if  A(v) then  ∀v.A(v).
Lemma 8.7 For all M of type 1 and I, A and terms t, t′ we have
D([t = t]) = D([t′ = t′])
Proof. Suppose that
D([t = t]) 6= D([t′ = t′])
Then the type 1 condition implies that there is a H such that
HD([t = t]) 6= HD([t′ = t′])
But
[t = t] = P0(P0([v = w]vw, t), t)
Hence applying the definition of H yields
HD([t = t]) = T ↔ D(t) = D(t)
hence we have HD([t = t]) = T and also analogously HD([t′ = t′]) = T and so we obtain a
contradiction.
Lemma 8.8 ([1]A8*(a)) For type 1 models we have (B1)  (A↔ B)↔ [A] = [B].
Proof. We must show that GD[IAM((A ↔ B) ↔ [A] = [B]]) = T , which is equivalent ot
showing that
GDIAM([(A↔ B)]) = T iff GDIAM([[A] = [B]]) = T
that is,
GDIAM([[A↔ B] = [[A = B] = [A = B]]]) = T iff GDIAM([[A] = [B]]) = T
which is equivalent to
DIAM([A↔ B]) = DIAM([[A = B] = [A = B]]) iff DIAM([[A]) = DIAM([B])
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Consider all assignments A′ like A except for the assignment on v. Then DIAM[A(v)]αv =
DIA′M[A(v)]αv and DIAM[B(v)]αv = DIA′M[B(v)]αv. So if DIAM[A(v)]αv = DIAM[B(v)]αv
the for any A′ we have DIA′M[A(v)]α = DIA′M[B(v)]α and one direction follows.
We now need to show that if for all such A′ we have
DIA′M[A(v)]α = DIA′M[B(v)]α
then DIAM[A(v)]αv = DIAM[B(v)]αv. But if DIAM[A(v)]αv 6= DIAM[B(v)]αv then by the
type 1 condition there would be a H and a (x1, ..., xm) such that (x1, ...., xm) ∈ HDIAM[A(v)]αv
but (x1, ...., xm) /∈ HDIAM[B(v)]αv. But taking A′(v) = xn this means that
(x1, ...., xm−1) ∈ Hp0(DIAM[A(v)]αv,A′(v)) = HDIA′M[A(v)]α
but
(x1, ...., xm−1) /∈ Hp0(DIAM[B(v)]αv,A′(v)) = HDIA′M[B(v)]α
and we obtain a contradiction.
Lemma 8.10 ([1] A11*) In the same conditions we have (S5’)  vi 6= vj → vi 6= vj.
Proof. We must show that if TIAM(vi 6= vj) then TIAM(vi 6= vj).
But if TIAM(vi 6= vj) then DIAM(vi) 6= DIAM(vk). But this is equivalent to A(vi) 6= A(vk).
This means that for all H ∈ H we have H([vi 6= vj]) = T and the conclusion follows.
Lemma 8.11 ([1] A9) In the same conditions we have (T)  A→ A .
Proof. If TIAM(A) then ∀H ∈ H we have HDIAM([A]) = T and so in particular TIAM(A)
Lemma 8.12 ([1] A10) In the same conditions we have (K)  (A→ B)→ (A→ B).
Proof. Assume TIAM((A → B). Then ∀H ∈ H we have HDIAM[A → B] = T which
means that if HDIAM([A]) = T then HDIAM([B]). To show that TIAM(A→ B) consider
any K ∈ H. Assume that ∀H ∈ H we have HDIAM([A]) = T . Then KDIAM([A]) = T
and hence KDIAM([B]) = T . Hence we have ∀H ∈ H we have HDIAM([B]) = T and thus
TIAM(A→ B).
9 Completeness of T1
In this section we show completeness:
Lemma 9.1 If a sentence A is T1-valid then ` A.
It is enough to show that:
Lemma 9.2 A set Γ of sentences of T1 is consistent iff Γ has a model.
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By soundness an inconsistent set of formulas cannot have a model so we only need prove
one implication. This lemma is enough to prove completeness for is a formula A is T1-valid
then ¬A cannot have a model, otherwise there would be a model for which both A and ¬A
held. Since ¬A does not have a model by the lemma above ¬A is inconsistent and hence we
have ¬A ` ¬x = x, that is ` ¬A→ ¬x = x or ` x = x→ A from which it follows that ` A.
Given a consistent set Γ of sentences we form an extension Lω∗ of Lω consisting of countably
infinite constants and n-ary predicate symbols Fi (including 0-ary propositional constants) and
consider any enumeration S1, S2, ... of all sentences. Consider also any enumeration of all closed
terms [B]x̄. We apply the following process to the sequence S1, S2, .... Consider the first closed
term [B]x̄ and chose a F and let [F (x1, ..xn)]x̄ = [B]x̄ be Sk. If F does not occur in a sentence
before Sk or in B or in Γ then we proceed to the next closed term. Otherwise chose any F
′
which satisfies this condition and let Sm be [F
′(x1, ..xn)]x̄ = [B]x̄. Then switch the positions of
Sm and Sk in the enumeration S1, S2, ... and proceed to the next closed term. Any finite initial
segments of the resulting transformations of the resulting sequence S ′1, S
′
2, ... will stabilise after
a finite number of iterations (we do not move an element of a sequence twice).
From now on we assume that we have a consistent set Γ and that we have an enumeration
S1, S2, ... of sentences of L
ω satisfying the property that for any closed term t there is a predicate
symbol F and a Sk of the form [F (x1, ..xn)]x̄ = t such that F does not occur in Γ, t or in any
Sj before Sk.
We construct an array ∆ij(i, j ≥ 1) of sets of sentences is the following form:
• ∆11 = Γ.
• ∆ij = ∆ij−1 ∪ Cij ∪ {Sj} if j > 1 and {Sj} ∪∆ij−1 ∪ Eij is consistent.
• ∆ij = ∆ij−1 ∪ Cij if j > 1 and {Sj} ∪∆ij−1 ∪ Eij is inconsistent.
• ∆i1 = {∃x̄.¬A↔ B} if Si−1 is [A]x̄ 6= [B]x̄ and Si−1 ∈ ∆i−1i−1
• ∆i1 = ∆i−1i−1 otherwise.
here
Eij = {[A]x̄ = [B]ȳ : ∃k,m.k ≤ i,m ≤ j, (k,m) 6= (i, j)&∆km ` [A]x̄ = [B]ȳ}
for j > 1 and
Eij = {[A]x̄ = [B]ȳ : ∃k,m.k ≤ i− 1,m ≤ i− 1&∆km ` [A]x̄ = [B]ȳ}
for j = 1. Consider the set (in the order of S1, S2, ...) of all existential sentences ∃x.A(x),∃x.A′(x), ...
in ∆ij−1 which occur before Sj. We proceed as follows. We start by picking a constant a1 such
that A(a1) is the first instantiation occuring after Sj such that ai does not occur before Sj or
in ∆ij−1 (or ∆i−1i−1 for j = 1). We then proceed to chose an constant a2 such that A
′(a2) is
the first instantiation after A(a1) such that a2 does not occur before or in A(a1) and so forth.
Cij consists of the set of such instantiations {A(a1), A′(a2), , ...}.
Lemma 9.3 ∆ij ∪ Eij is consistent.
Proof. By induction on the construction of ∆ij. The case ∆11 is trivial since Γ is consistent.
Let j ≥ 1 and assume by induction that ∆ij ∪ Eij is consistent.
Suppose that ∆ij+1 ∪ Eij+1 were inconsistent. Then ∆ij+1 ∪ Eij+1 ` ¬v = v which means
that for some finite set of formulas F1, ..., Fk of ∆ij+1 ∪ Eij+1 we have
(*) ` (F1 & F2 & ... & Fk)→ ¬v = v
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Suppose that ∆ij+1 = ∆ij ∪ Cij+1. If all the Fi’s belong ∆ij then this contradicts the
consistency of ∆ij ∪ Eij. Hence there is at least one Fi belonging to Cij+1 ∪ Eij+1.
If Fi is in Cij+1 then it is a C(a) where ∃v.C(v) is in ∆ij. We may reorganise (*) into the
form
` C1(a1)→ (C2(a2)→ ...→ (Fk → ¬v = v)...
so that each instantiation constant ai in the expression does not occur further ahead. Since
a1 does not occur further ahead we may substitute it for a fresh variable and then apply the
∃-introduction rule
` ∃x.C1(x)→ (C2(a2)→ ...→ (Fk → ¬v = v)...
and so on until we have replaced all formulas in Cij+1 by formulas in ∆ij.
If an Fi belongs to Eij+1 then it is an equality t = s such that we have ∆km ` t = s for
k ≤ i,m ≤ j + 1, (k,m) 6= (i, j + 1), that is ` (G1 & ... & Gn) → t = s for Gi ∈ ∆km.
We replace t = s by G1 & ... & Gn. Thus we may eliminate all such Fi and we obtain a
contradiction.
Now suppose that ∆ij+1 = ∆ij ∪ Cij+1 ∪ {Sj+1}.
Assume that ∆ij+1 ∪Eij+1 is inconsistent. Then ∆ij ∪Cij+1 ∪{Sj+1}∪Eij+1 is inconsistent
and using the previous argument we find F1....Fk in ∆ij ∪ {Sj+1} such that
` (F1 & F2 & ... & Fk)→ ¬v = v
which contradicts the way ∆ij+1 is formed in this case.
Finally we must consider the case of ∆i1. We assume by induction that ∆i−1i−1 ∪Ei−1i−1 is
consistent. If ∆i1 = ∆i−1i−1 then assume that ∆i−1i−1 ∪ E1i were inconsistent and we have
` (F1 & F2 & ... & Fk)→ ¬v = v
where the Fi are in ∆i−1i−1∪E1i. Now by definition E1i = Ei−1i−1∪{[A]x̄ = [B]ȳ : ∆i−1i−1 `
[A]x̄ = [B]ȳ} so an argument similar to the one above shows that we obtain a contradiction to
the consistency of ∆i−1i−1 ∪ Ei−1i−1.
If ∆i1 = {∃x̄.¬A ↔ B} then [A]x̄ 6= [B]x̄ ∈ ∆i−1i−1. Assume {∃x̄.¬A ↔ B} ∪ Ei1 were
inconsistent. Then there are equality sentences E1,...,Ek in Ei1 such that ` E1 → ... →
Ek → ∀x̄.A ↔ B. We then apply necessitation, (T) and (B) to obtain Ei1 ` [A]x̄ = [B]x̄, a
contradiction.
We now define ∆k =
⋃
j ∆kj and consider the set A consisting of all such ∆k for k ≥ 1.
Definition 9.4 Let L∗ω be an extension of Lω. A set A of sets of sentences in L∗ω is T1-perfect
if
• Every set in A is maximal, consistent and ω-complete.
• If an identity sentence t = t′ is in one of the sets of A it is in all of them.
• If a sentence [A]x̄ = [B]x̄ belongs to one set of A there is a set in A which contains the
sentence ∃x̄. ∼ A↔ B.
• For every closed term [B]x1...xn there is an atomic predicate F such that [B]x1...xn =
[F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn belongs to a set in A.
Lemma 9.5 A is T1-perfect.
29
Proof. Let ∆k ∈ A. We show first that ∆k is maximal, consistent and ω-complete. It is
obviously consistent because each ∆kj is consistent by the above lemma. To show that it is
maximal we need to show that for any sentence Si either Si or ¬Si = Sj is in ∆k. Suppose then
that neither formula was in ∆k. Then we must have that Si∪∆kj−1∪Ekj and Sj ∪∆kj−1∪Ekj
are inconsistent. Suppose w.l.o.g. that i < j. Then since ∆ki ⊆ ∆kj we get a contradiction.
For if both a sentence and it’s negation are inconsistent with a set of sentences, that set is
inconsistent.
To show that ∆k is ω-complete we need to show that if ∆k ` ∃v.F (v) then ∆k ` F (t) for
some term t. If ∆k ` ∃v.F (v) then by maximality ∃v.F (v) ∈ ∆k and let it have been introduced
in stage ∆ki. Then in a subsequent stage j, by construction it is clear that Cij and hence ∆
k
will contain a formula of the form F (c) for some constant c.
We now show that if an equality t = s is in one ∆k ∈ A then it is in them all. Let then
t = s be in a certain ∆k and consider any other ∆j. If ∆j is in a previous row then obviously
we cannot have ¬t = s ∈ ∆j because t = s must belong to a certain ∆km and ∆km ∪ Ekm is
consistent by the previous lemma. A similar argument show that ¬t = s cannot belong to a
∆j which is on a subsequent row.
We now show that if [A]x̄ 6= [B]x̄ is in a ∆k then there is a ∆j containing ∃x̄¬A ↔ B.
Suppose [A]x̄ 6= [B]x̄ is in ∆ki (minimal i for that condition) which is under or on the diagonal
(i ≤ k). Then the result follows directly from the construction of the transition between rows.
Suppose then that it is above the diagonal. Notice that in all subsequent ∆ki’s we cannot have
∆ki ` [A]x̄ = [B]x̄ and we just ”slide” down the column until reaching below the diagonal and
get as desired.
Finally we show that for any closed term [G]x̄ there is a primitive predicate F such that
[G]x̄ = [F (x1, ..., xk)]x1,...,xk . We can choose such a F (let [G]x̄ = [F (x1, ..., xk)]x1,...,xk be Si) so
that F does not occur in any of the previous Sj, in G or in Γ. Hence in the stage where Si may
be introduced this formula is consistent with the previous ∆kj in the same row (including for
any previous column) and thus belongs to ∆k.
Definition 9.6 Consider a T1-perfect set A and a ∆ ∈ A. We define an order < on predicate
symbols (such that the first element is =) and variables. We define the canonical model as
follows. Consider the set D∆ consisting of those symbols F such that there are no G < F for
which [F (x1, ...xn)]x1...xn = [G(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ∈ ∆ and those constants a such that there is
no [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = a ∈ ∆ and there are no constants b such that b < a and a = b ∈ ∆.
We let Di∆ divide the symbols according to arity for i ≥ 0, the case i = −1 corresponding to
constants. The distinguished equality element is simply =. The extension functions H ∈ H
are determined by the ∆’s in A and the actual extension function by ∆. We have that H∆(F )
consists of all (F1, ..., Fn) such that [Fi(v1, ..., vn)]v1...vn = ti ∈ ∆ or Fi is a constant ci and
F (t1, ...tn) ∈ ∆ . We now define the eight model operations.




where [F (v1, ...vk, u1, ..., uk)]v1...vku1...uk = [F
′(v1, .., .vk)]v1...vku1...uk ∈ ∆ and
[G(v1, ..., vk, u1, ..., uk)]v1...vku1...uk = [G
′(u1, ..., uk)]v1...vku1...uk ∈ ∆
n(F ) = H iff [H(v1, ...vk)]v1...vk = [∼ F (v1, ...vk)]v,...vk ∈ ∆
u(F ) = H iff [H(v1, ...vk)]v1...vk = [∃v.F (v1, ...vk, v)]v1...vk ∈ ∆
e(F ) = H iff [H(v1, ...vk)]v1...vk = [F (v1, ...vk−1)]v1...vk ∈ ∆
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i(F ) = H iff [H(v1, ...vk)]v1...vk = [F (v1, ..., vk, vk−1)]v1...vk ∈ ∆
c(F ) = H iff [H(v1, ...vk)]v1...vk = [F (vk, v1, v2, ..., vk−1)]v1...vk ∈ ∆
r(F ) = H iff [H(v1, ...vk)]v1...vk = [F (v1, ...vk, vk)]v1...vk ∈ ∆
pi(F,G) = H iff [H(v1, ...vk, w1, ...wi)]v1...vkw1...wi = [F (v1, ...vk, [G(x1, ..., xj, w1, ...wi)]x1...xj)]v1...vkw1...wi ∈
∆
Note how the condition on< guarantees that these operations are well-defined. FInally there
is a canonical interpretation I∆ which associates to a F theG inD∆ such that [G(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn =
[F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ∈ ∆ and to a constant c the constant d ∈ D∆ such that c = d ∈ ∆.
Lemma 9.7 The canonical model defined above with the canonical interpretation is a T1-model
and a model for ∆.
Proof. The conditions of the extension functions are verified as follows.
Suppose that (F1, ..., Fk, G1, ..., Gm) ∈ H∆H for H = k(F,G). Then we have closed terms
ti, t
′
i such that Fi[x1w, ..., xsi ]x1...xsj = ti, Gi[x1, ..., xpi ]x1...xpi = t
′





But since [H(v1, ...vk, u1, ..., um)]v1...vku1...um = [F
′(v1, ...vk)&G
′(u1, ...uk)]v1...vku1...uk ∈ ∆ where
[F (v1, ...vk, u1, ..., uk)]v1...vku1...uk = [F
′(v1, .., .vk)]v1...vku1...uk ∈ ∆ and
[G(v1, ..., vk, u1, ..., uk)]v1...vku1...uk = [G
′(u1, ..., uk)]v1...vku1...uk ∈ ∆
one direction of axiom (B) and (T) yield ∀v1, ..., vk, u1, ...um.F ′(v1, ...vk)&G′(u1, ...uk) ↔
H(v1, ...vk, u1, ..., um) and
∀v1, ..., vk, u1, ...um.F (v1, ..., vk, u1, ..., uk)↔ F ′(v1, .., .vk) ∈ ∆ and
∀v1, ..., vk, u1, ...um.G(v1, ..., vk, u1, ..., uk)↔ G′(u1, ..., uk) ∈ ∆.
whence we deduce that F ′(t1, ...tk)&G
′(t′1, ...t
′
k) ∈ ∆ and hence F (t1, ..., tk, t′1, ..., t′k) and




k) are in ∆ which is equivalent to (F1, ...., Fk) ∈ H∆F and (G1, ...., Gm) ∈
H∆G. The other direction is similar. The conditions for u,e,i,c,r are proven in the same
way. We now show the condition for pi. Suppose we had (F1, ...Fk, G1, ...Gi−1) ∈ H∆pi(F,G)
where pi(F,G) = H. Then we have closed terms ti, t
′
i such that Fi[x1w, ..., xsi ]x1...xsj = ti,
Gi[x1, ..., xpi ]x1...xpj = t
′




i) ∈ ∆. But since [H(v1, ...vk, w1, ...wi)]v1...vkw1...wi =
[F (v1, ...vk, [G(x1, ..., xj, w1, ...wi)]x1...xj)]v1...vkw1...wi ∈ ∆ using as previously (B) and (T) we get
that





We need to prove that (F1, ..., Fk, p
j
o(G,G1, ..., Gj)) ∈ H∆F . This is equivalent to proving that,
for H = pjo(G,G1, ..., Gj) there is a t = [H(y1, ....yj)]y1...yj such that F (t1, ..., tk, t) ∈ ∆. But this
follows from taking the H ∈ D∆ such that [H(y1, ....yj)]y1...yj = [G(x1, ..., xj, t′1, ...t′i)]x1...xj =
[G(x1, ..., xj, Gi[x1, ..., xp1 ]x1...xp1 , ..., Gi[x1, ..., xpi ]x1...xpi )]x1...xj .
We now need prove the T1 condition. Let F 6= G for F,G ∈ D∆. Then [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn 6=
[G(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ∈ ∆. Since A is T1 perfect there exists a ∆′ such that ∃x̄.¬F (x1, .., xn)↔
G(x1, ..., xn) ∈ ∆′. Hence by ω-completness there are terms t1, ..., tn such that ¬F (t1, .., tn)↔
G(t1, ..., tn) ∈ ∆′ and the result follows.
We now prove by induction on complexity that we obtain a model of the sentences in ∆.
For the atomic case note that if t = [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ∈ ∆ and F ∈ D∆ then Dt = F . Thus
if A(t1, ..., tn) ∈ ∆ consider ti = [Fi(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ∈ ∆ with Fi ∈ D∆ . Then (Dt1, ...Dtn) =
(F1, ...Fn) ∈ GI(F ) so GD[A(t1, ...tn)] = T . Consider A&B ∈ ∆. Then by completeness A and
B belong to ∆ and thus by induction G[A] = T and G[B] = T and thus GD[A&B] = T . The
case of ¬A is similar. Finally if ∃x.A(x) ∈ ∆ then ω-completeness implies that there is a closed
term t such that A(t) ∈ ∆ and so by induction GD[A(t)] = T . Now use lemma 7.6 and 8.3
with A(v) = F for t = [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ∈ ∆.
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10 Soundness and Completeness of T2
We have already proven the soundness of the standard first-order logical axioms and rules
for any model. Also the soundess of axioms 6 and 7. Axioms 9 to 11 are clearly sound by the
type 2 model condition.
Lemma 10.1 TGen is sound: suppose that F does not occur in A(v). If ` A([F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn)
then we can infer ` A(t) whenever t complex, of arity n and is free for v in A.
Proof. By (L) we have
` [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = t→ A([F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn)→ A(t)
from which it follows that
` A([F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn)→ [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = t→ A(t)
Assume  A([F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn). Then by soundness of (L), (MP) and tautologies we get
 [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = t→ A(t)
By the non-cycling condition for T2 models F does not occur in t and hence the interpre-
tation of F does not affect the denotation of Dt. But choose an interpretation I assigning
to [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn the value Dt. In this case we have  [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = t and hence
TI(A(t)). But since D[A(t)] cannot depend on the interpretation is we must have  A(t).
Lemma 10.2 We have that [A]x̄ = [B]x̄ → A↔ B is sound.
Proof. For any T2 model, interpretation and assignment we must show that T ([A]x̄ = [B]x̄ →
A ↔ B). We must show that if T ([A]x̄ = [B]x̄) then T (A ↔ B). Now if T ([A]x̄ = [B]x̄) then
we have D[A]x̄ = D[B]x̄. We now show that T (A ↔ B). We show only one implication, the
other is similar. We need only show that T (∀x̄.A→ B), that is, GD[∀x̄.A→ B] = T . Now
D[∀x̄.A→ B] = D[¬∃x̄.¬(A→ B)] = D[¬∃x̄.A&¬B]
= ne.....eD[A&¬B]x̄ = ue...ekD[A]x̄nD[B]x̄ = ue...ekD[A]x̄nD[A]x̄
So ∅ ∈ Hue...ekD[A]x̄nD[A]x̄ iff there is no (x1, ...., xn) such that (x1, ..., xn) ∈ HD[A]x̄ and
(x1, ..., xn) /∈ HD[A]x̄. Hence GD[∀x̄.A→ B] = T .
Note that this rule is sound for any model.
Lemma 10.3 Let Γ be a consistent set of sentences in T2. Then it is included in a maximal,
consistent, ω-complete set of sentences ∆ such that for each closed term [A]x1,...xn the sentence
[A]x1,...xn = [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1,...,xn belongs to ∆, for some symbol F .
Proof. We assume we have an enumeration S1, S2, ... of the sentences of L
ω as in the proof of
completeness of T1. Let ∆0 = Γ. Then given ∆i, consider the sentence Si+1. If it is consistent
with ∆i then ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪{Si+1}∪Ci otherwise ∆i+1 = ∆i ∪Ci. Consider the set (in the order
of S1, S2, ...) of all existential sentences ∃x.A(x),∃x.A′(x), ... in ∆i which occur before Si+1. We
proceed as follows. We start by picking a constant a1 such that A(a1) is the first instantiation
occuring after Si+1 such that a1 does not occur before Si+1 or in ∆i. We then proceed to chose
an constant a2 such that A
′(a2) is the first instantiation after A(a1) such that a2 does not occur
before or in A(a1) and so forth. Ci consists of the set of such instantiations {A(a1), A′(a2), , ...}.
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Each ∆i is consistent, by a similar argument as in the T1 case.
We show first that ∆ =
⋃
∆i is maximal, consistent and ω-complete. It is obviously
consistent because each ∆i is consistent. To show that it is maximal we need to show that
for any sentence Si either Si or ¬Si = Sj is in ∆. Suppose then that neither formula was in
∆. Then we must have that Si ∪ ∆i−1 and Sj ∪ ∆j−1 are inconsistent. Suppose w.l.o.g. that
i < j. Then since ∆i ⊆ ∆j we get a contradiction. For if both a sentence and it’s negation are
inconsistent with a set of sentences, that set is inconsistent.
To show that ∆ is ω-complete we need to show that if ∆ ` ∃v.F (v) then ∆ ` F (t) for some
term t. If ∆ ` ∃v.F (v) then by maximality ∃v.F (v) ∈ ∆ and let it have been introduced in
stage ∆i. Then in a subsequent stage j, by construction it is clear that Cj and hence ∆ will
contain a formula of the form F (c) for some constant c.
Finally we show that for any closed term [G]x̄ there is a primitive predicate F such that
[G]x̄ = [F (x1, ..., xk)]x1,...,xk . We can choose such a F (let [G]x̄ = [F (x1, ..., xk)]x1,...,xk be Si) so
that F does not occur in any of the previous Sj, in G or in Γ. Hence in the stage where Si may
be introduced this formula is consistent with the previous ∆j and thus belongs to ∆.
We form the canonical model and canonical interpretation as in the T1 case, using ∆.
Verification that we obtain in fact a model is the same. Note that were in the T1 case we used
(B) and (T) here we can make use of axiom 8. The only difference is that we have only one
extension function G ∈ H corresponding to ∆ itself.
Lemma 10.4 The canonical model defined above with the canonical interpretation is a T2-
model and a model for ∆.
Proof. We check the type 2 condition. The condition of being one-to-one clearly follows
from axioms 10 and 11. For instance if we had F = n(G) = n(G′) for F,G,G′ ∈ D∆ then
[F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = [¬G(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ] and [F (x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn = [¬G′(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ] are
in ∆. But since ∆ is maximal we have then [¬G(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ] = [¬G′(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ] ∈ ∆
and hence by axiom 10 that [G(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ] = G
′(x1, ..., xn)]x1...xn ] ∈ ∆. But the conditions
on elements of D∆ imply then that G = G
′. The condition of having disjoint ranges similarly
follows from axiom 9. The non-cycling condition follows from axiom 12.
We prove by induction on complexity that we obtain a model of the sentences in ∆ in the
same way as in lemma 9.7.
11 Fregean Arithmetic in T2
Let ∆ be a marked binary predicate in T2, where we write x∆y for ∆(x, y).
Lemma 11.1 Bealer, Quality and Concept, p122.
Proof. We must show that NN0, where
0 = [¬∃v(v∆y)]y
NNx ≡df ∀z(I(z)→ x∆z)
where
I(z) ≡df 0∆z & (∀y(y∆z → S(y)∆z))
and
S(x) ≡df [∃u(u∆x & ∃v(¬v∆u & y ∼= [w = v ∨ w∆u)]w)]y
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x ∼= y ≡df ∀w(w∆x↔ w∆y)
We have the tautology 0∆z & (∀y(y∆z → S(y)∆z))→ 0∆z to which applying ∀-generalization
we get immediately the formula NN0.
We now show that NNx→ NN(S(x)). We must show that
∀z(I(z)→ x∆z)→ ∀z(I(z)→ S(x)∆z)
By tautologies and a quantifier axiom we have
I(z)→ ∀y(y∆z → S(y)∆z)→ (x∆z → S(x)∆z)
If we consider the tautology A→ (B → C)→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C)) then we get
` (I(z)→ x∆z)→ (I(z)→ S(x)∆z)
and hence using generalization and ∀x(A→ B)→ (∀xA→ ∀xB):
` ∀z(I(z)→ x∆z)→ ∀z(I(z)→ S(x)∆z))
which is NN(x)→ N(S(x)).
We now show that ¬∃x : 0 = S(x). But this equivalent to
∀x¬([¬∃v(v∆y)]y = [∃u(u∆x & ∃v(¬v∆u & y ∼= [w = v ∨ w∆u)]w)]y
which is an immediate consequence of the T2 axiom for these intensional abstracts belong to
different domains.
We now show that x = y → S(x) = S(y).
Consider [u∆v]v. Then [u∆x] is the predication of [(u∆v)]v of x and [u∆y] is the predication
of [(u∆v)]v of y. The axiom (A11) yields immediately that x = y → [u∆x] = [u∆y]. Denoting
[(∃v(¬v∆u & z ∼= [(w = v ∨ w∆u)]w))]z by s we get by the same axiom that x = y →
[(u∆x & s)]z = [(u∆y & s)]z where we first apply (A10) to obtain the expansions [u∆x]z and
[u∆y]z. Finally we apply the same axiom for existential generalization to obtain as desired.
Finally we must show that ∀z(I(z) → ∀x(NNx → x∆z)). The result follows easily from
quantifier rules and axioms from I(z)→ (NNx→ x∆z) which is just the tautology
A→ ((A→ B)→ B)
Let A(x) ≡df NNx & ∃y.(NNy & y = S(x)). Consider the following predication axiom
x∆[A(u)]u ↔ A(x)
Then according to Bealer we have:
Theorem 11.2 Quality and Concept, p127. If we add the above predication axiom the complete
theory for the structure < NN,=, S, 0 > is derivable in T2.
Frege’s Law V is generally blamed for the paradoxes. But the paradoxes can be avoided if
the law is retained but higher-order variables and quantifiers are dropped, for then we obtain
the sound and complete system of first-order logic with extensional abstraction (T1 with modal
collapse), law V corresponding to axiom (B).
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12 Conclusion and Future Work
We have given detailed proofs of the soundess and completeness of Bealer’s systems T1
and T2 as well as simplifying the original presentation of Bealer Decomposition in [1]. There
are many other results which are stated (with or without a sketch of a proof) in Quality and
Concept as well as open problems. There is a whole avenue to explore regarding the addition
of ”predication” axioms to T2. In particular, we should give a detailed proof of Theorem
11.2 of the previous section. In [1][pp.67 - 68] Bealer proposes a way of combining T1 and
T2 into a single logic. Here equality means T2 equality (which is finer) and T1 equality is
represented by an additional equivalence relation ≈. One problem with proving soundness and
completenes seems to be that we need to use Bealer’s lemma. But in this case Bealer lemma
will be an identity involving ≈ rather than =. Thus it would seem that we need to add an
extra condition on the extension functions: x ∈ Hy and z ≈ x implies that z ∈ Hy. To
prove the completeness of system T2’ seems to the most logical follow-up to the present work.
Another interesting aspect would be to abandon the rather cumbersome Hilbert-style axiomatic
system and formulate a natural deduction version of T1 and T2 instead. The major challenge
in Quality and Concept is to find an axiomatization and prove soundness and completeness for
Bealer’s System T3. Syntactically T3 is like T1 and T2 except that there are now two distinct
term-forming operators [A]x̄ and |A|x̄. Hence we will have two version of the Bealer operators
and the semantics must have two sets of the corresponding functions. We now give a brief
descriptions of the structure of the models envisioned by Bealer.
According to Bealer the building blocks of reality consist in primitive qualities, connections
and conditions. Bealer, in his realist, anti-representationalist approach in Quality and Concept,
ch.8, argues that we should consider two sets of syntactic operators, one for forming rela-
tions, properties and conditions (pertaining to objective phenomenality) out of the primitives
C, I,N,E, U,R, Pn, K and C
′, I ′, N ′, E ′, U ′, R′, P ′n, K
′ for forming thoughts and ideas (pertain-
ing to the subjective or conceptual), which includes Cambridge properties. Our thoughts are
ultimately grounded in reality itself: they should possess a decomposition tree into objective
phenomenal components.
We now consider the model-theoretic counterpart in which to the two classes of syntac-
tic operations C, I,N,E, U,R, Pn, K and C
′, I ′, N ′, E ′, U ′, R′, P ′n, K
′ correspond to operations
c, i, n, e, u, r, pn, k and c
′, i′, n′, e′, u′, r′, p′n, k
′ on a set D partioned into disjoint sets Di corre-
sponding to the different arities of intensional terms. We will call the first set of operations
primary entity operations o2 and the second set secondary entity operations o1. Secondary-
entity operations must satisfy injectivity, disjoint range and non-cycling conditions (Postulate
I). In D we consider two fundamental domains: secondary entities E2 which are defined as the
range of o2 and primary entities E1 defined as the range of o1. Given a d ∈ D we can seek
for various possible decompositions through the inverse of the operations o1 and o2. Note that
such decompositions do not need to follow the order of the (in this case generalised) Bealer
decomposition. We denote a decomposition by oi(d1, ....dk) for di ∈ D and we can distinguish
those di which are the second or further argument of a Pn or P
′
n and those that are not (Bealer
calls these subject nodes). Our decompositions may involve the intertwining of both o1 and o2.
Then there are two kinds of ”primes”, those that cannot be decomposed in terms of o1,
which we call simple primary entities P1 and those that cannot be decomposed in terms of
o2 which we call secondary primary entities P2. For each of these sets we can consider their
restrictions to the various Di. We have obviously
D = E1 ∪ E2 ∪P1 ∪P2
Clearly P1 ∩ E1 = ∅ and P2 ∩ E2 = ∅. We put C = E2 ∩ E1 (Cambridge entities). What
is the relationship of P2 to E1 ? We consider the E1 which are not Cambridge entities, that
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is, P = E1 ∩ P2, to be primitive entitieswhich cannot be further decomposed via an abstract
thought-operation.
The other postulate (Postulate II) is that all secondary entities must admit a decomposi-
tion o2(d1, ...d2) in which the di are either in P or subject nodes. It would be interesting to
understand better the significance of this postulate of Bealer’s.
We note that P need not be closed under the operations o1. If we consider its intersection
with the various Di we get primitive beings for i = −1, propositions for i = 0, qualities for
i = 1 and connections for i > 1. A part M⊂ P ∩D−1 consists of minds, those beings capable
of entering into transcendental connections [1][ 245-248].
After the publication of [1] in 1982 Bealer continued to develop his theory of PRPs for over
two decades, in particular in [3, 7] where the distinction between platonic and non-platonic
modes of presentation is made as well as a further definition of ”logical form”. It is clear that
an analysis of different forms of syntactic decomposition of formulas and terms plays a central
role. It seems natural that a combination with approaches which focus (in a non-nominalistic
way) on the constructive or algorithmic meaning of the syntactic structure of expressions, such
as those of Tichý[30, 31] or Moschovakis[24], are likely to prove fruitiful is bringing the theory
of PRPs to a conclusive and satisfactory form.
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